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seems to be a focus on the experience of combat. Training, particularly individual training, is rarely
discussed beyond a cursory mention, and if it is discussed at all, the overwhelming tendency is to paint a
picture of half-trained cannon fodder, at best.
This paper’s goal is twofold: First, explore methods of instruction at the individual and unit levels, and
explain the reasoning behind the evolution of training as the Army Ground Forces’ understanding of
contemporary warfare changed; second, provide a case study at the unit level by examining the combat
record of the 28th Infantry Division as well as training experiences from retired soldiers in the infantry
branch.
For the sake of brevity and clarity, infantry training in the United States Army will be scrutinized, on the
grounds that infantry provided the bulk of combat arms within the United States military. However, the
prosecution of combined arms warfare meant that infantrymen had to operate in conjunction with other
combat arms such as artillery and armor.
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Kaspriskie 1
Introduction
A common theme in memoirs, oral histories, and other sources dealing with servicemen
in World War II seems to be a focus on the experience of combat. Training, particularly
individual training, is rarely discussed beyond a cursory mention, and if it is discussed at all, the
overwhelming tendency is to paint a picture of half-trained cannon fodder, at best.
This paper’s goal is twofold: First, explore methods of instruction at the individual and
unit levels, and explain the reasoning behind the evolution of training as the Army Ground
Forces’ understanding of contemporary warfare changed; second, provide a case study at the unit
level by examining the combat record of the 28th Infantry Division as well as training
experiences from retired soldiers in the infantry branch.
For the sake of brevity and clarity, infantry training in the United States Army will be
scrutinized, on the grounds that infantry provided the bulk of combat arms within the United
States military. However, the prosecution of combined arms warfare meant that infantrymen had
to operate in conjunction with other combat arms such as artillery and armor.
Thesis
Although individual training standards actually increased for new inductees, these higher
training standards did not correlate to better performance in combat at either the individual or
unit level due to the loss of experience in collective training and combat.
Historiography
Two digitized oral histories from Special Collections were used to show the typical
induction experience for soldiers serving in the European Theater of Operations. Both Jay Gross,
Jr. and Alan Tobie were inducted into Army service and saw combat as infantrymen in the ETO.
These oral histories are not so much intended to identify what Army Ground Forces considered
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typical experiences as they are intended to check against what Army Ground Forces considered
“standard” individual training experiences.
To enhance understanding of what this experience was like, period materials such as FM
21-20 Basic Field Manual: Physical Training and WD PAM 21-9 Physical Conditioning will be
used to show what was considered acceptable to the Army in terms of individual physical
conditioning, in addition to Whitfield B. East’s postwar study A Historical Review and Analysis
of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment.
Additionally, pamphlets from Camp Kilmer and Camp Myles Standish will illustrate
what the average experience in an embarkation camp was like, while “Shortage of Railroad
Equipment for Transportation Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee Pursuant to S. Res.
185,” Roger D. Thorne’s “When German Prisoners of War Rode the Pennsy,” Chester
Wardlow’s The Technical Services—The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization,
and Operation, and two railroad timetables from the wartime and immediate postwar periods
will illustrate the complexity of organizing unit or individual movement within the United States.
“Training of the American Soldier During World War One and World War Two” by
Roger K. Spickelmier focused on the evolution of training from World War One, where the
United States was able to mobilize, but not equip, a relatively smaller force that it eventually
managed to surpass in World War Two, and therefore supplements the oral histories by filling in
gaps in the training narrative. Where Spickelmier fell short was in his focus on individual, but
not unit training. Additionally, while Spickelmier was able to show changes in terms of hours of
instruction, he did not actually show how this instruction was delivered or how it was scheduled
within basic training. In other words, one is able to know how much instruction in a certain
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subject was being given, but without prior experience, one does not know how it fit into the
overall basic training curriculum.
Conrad C. Crane, et al.’s Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army’s Cycle of Basic
Combat Training, 1918-2019 built upon Spickelmier’s interrogation of how the infantry branch
trained its troops by extending into the present day. Crane et al also showed a more specific
breakdown of what phases of training actually entailed, and to a limited extent provided more
insight as to where soldiers went for individual training. This included, for certain branches,
combined basic and specialized training reminiscent of modern One Station Unit Training
(OSUT) programs. However, Crane et al did not show what the actual syllabus was for
individual training, nor did Crane et al discuss locations for infantry training or if they were
structured similarly to branches with OSUT-style training.
The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops by
William R. Keast and Robert R. Palmer will be used to show what the Army expected its
notional collective, rather than individual training standard to be, based on studies conducted
with nine infantry divisions (including one segregated or “Negro” division). Although Keast and
Palmer’s work was exhaustive, it did not focus exclusively on the infantryman, because it
focused on Army Ground Forces’ role as one of three equal components within the Army.
Additionally, Keast and Palmer included other combat arms in their study. While useful in terms
of lessons learned in a combined arms environment, it is beyond the scope of what this paper
intends to accomplish.
Nathan Marzoli’s article “The Best Substitute: US Army Low-Mountain Training in the
Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains, 1943-1944” discussed large-scale unit training programs
in the United States impacting seven infantry divisions, including the targeted 28th Infantry
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Division. Marzoli actually went into some detail regarding how unit training was structured and
provided a reasonably detailed curriculum for specialized unit training at the battalion, regiment,
and division level. This will be supplemented by Marshall A. Becker’s The Amphibious Training
Center, dealing with amphibious training that the 1st, 4th, 28th, and 29th Infantry Divisions
received in the United States before the landing forces of Operation Overlord were selected.
Weaver’s “The Volunteers of 1941: The Pennsylvania National Guard and Continuity in
American Military Policy” and Holt’s “Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry
Division, September to December 1944” both provide insight into the early and mid-war aspects
of the 28th Infantry Division’s operational history. “Operational Performance” in particular,
along with Thomas Bradbeer’s “General Cota and the Battle of Hürtgen Forest: A Failure of
Battle Command?” present contradictory accounts of the 28th Infantry Division’s effectiveness in
the field, but both examine the division’s abortive offensive in rough and heavily wooded terrain.
Antony Beevor’s Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge will be used to examine the
performance of the 28th Infantry Division during the Ardennes Offensive, particularly the 112th
Infantry Regiment’s performance in the defense of St. Vith, Belgium, as part of an ad hoc unit
consisting of elements from four separate divisions. To a lesser extent, Ardennes 1944 will also
be used to supplement Bradbeer’s “General Cota and the Battle of Hürtgen Forest” as well as
Holt’s “Operational Performance”.
Individual Training Theory
By 1940, the Army had recognized that it was not only necessary to establish, organize,
and train new units on a wholesale basis, but that its system of training soldiers on an individual
replacement basis needed a dramatic overhaul as well. Until this time, the Army’s protective
mobilization plan had been predicated on the models implemented in the First World War, where
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training standards were largely left up to unit commanders at either the battalion, regiment, or
brigade level.1 Additionally, the individual soldier received the same type of training, regardless
of what would eventually be termed his military occupational specialty (MOS).2 This was
acceptable in the First World War and in the interwar period mostly due to the smaller overall
size of the force; with a greater number of professional soldiers to inexperienced recruits,
training could be completed to standard more often than not.3
Army leadership recognized that training would need to be somewhat centralized, though
the vast numbers of both volunteers and conscripts would inundate the replacement system. To
that end, leadership directed Army Ground Forces to establish a number of replacement training
depots within the Zone of the Interior.4 Army Ground Forces partially drew on lessons learned
from the First World War, where replacement training depots were also set up to fill out units
affected by combat losses.
While this system worked to raise the initial forces employed in the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF), the system failed to provide for adequately trained replacements
throughout the balance of 1918. Keast and Palmer described the First World War-era system as
follows:
In World War I the plan for producing replacements in the combat arms provided for
training in depot brigades set up in each divisional cantonment…Training at the centers

1

Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, Jessica J. Sheets, Shane P. Reilly, “Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The
Army’s Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019,” (Army Heritage and Education Center), 1, 7-8, also Leonard
L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington, D.C: Department of the
Army, 1954) 242.
2
Crane et al., “Learning the Lessons,” 1. During World War II, MOSes were further broken down into Service
Specialization Numbers (SSNs).
3
Ibid 4. This was purely theoretical; in practice, units during World War I could deploy without conducting any
training whatsoever.
4
Robert R. Palmer and William R. Keast, The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground
Combat Troops (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1991) 169. Army Ground Forces has since
been reorganized and redesignated as Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).
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was thrown into constant confusion by emergency drafts, and the training was poorly
conducted. The replacements they turned out received, on the average, less than a month
of training…It finally became necessary, in order to meet the mounting casualties of
divisions in the line, to strip the infantry privates from ten divisions which had arrived in
France, thus breaking the divisions up or reducing them to skeletons.5
Even with these failures to provide adequately trained soldiers, there were elements of
training that Army Ground Forces saw as beneficial or even necessary to emulate. Army Ground
Forces found that replacement training centers for individual combat arms was useful because it
allowed training to be segregated by combat arm, a practice that continues today.6 This was
slightly modified from the First World War model by the addition of replacement training
centers for the support services.7 What Army Ground Forces sought to do by adding replacement
training centers for the support services was to prevent two things: First, prevent the
occupational loss of infantry to the support services; second (and directly related to the first),
prevent disruption of unit training by stripping combat troops from second-echelon units.8 In
practice, neither goal was totally achieved—as one may see, certain units up to the divisional
level were often shoehorned into the role of training units—but in general, Army Ground Forces
was successful in creating a segregation between MOSes based upon combat arm or support
service.
As always, this system could be misused, abused, or even ignored entirely. In some cases,
this was due to a surplus of soldiers within a certain MOS, while a deficit in another MOS had to

5

Palmer and Keast, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 169-170.
Ibid 170. This process is now known as Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and follows Basic Combat Training
(BCT).
7
Ibid 170-171.
8
Ibid 171.
6
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be filled. In extreme cases, this was done at echelons up to the division level. In at least one
instance, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commanding Army Ground Forces, complained at
length to General of the Army George C. Marshall about the superficiality of some ad hoc
reassignments; in one memo dated 1 January 1944, McNair wrote that “One division commander
himself told me that when he needed replacements he went to the replacement depot and chose
his men individually, regardless of arm or specialty, based primarily on their appearance and
actions—somewhat as one would buy a horse.”9
Additionally, there was jurisdictional friction over which command the replacement
training depots would fall under. To give a sense of scale to Army Ground Forces’ debate over
centralization of training, by the end of the war, the infantry branch alone operated thirteen
separate replacement training centers, mostly clustered in the southeastern part of the continental
United States.10 Some of these installations were shared with other combat arms or with the
services of supply, such as Camp Roberts, California (shared with the field artillery branch),
Camp Hood, Texas (shared with the armor branch), or Camp Robinson, Arkansas (shared with
the Medical Corps).11
Initially, all replacement centers fell under the command of the Services of Supply,
including two directly reporting overseas replacement depots located in the east and west of the
continental United States.12 After an unfavorable report regarding the Shenango overseas
replacement depot in April 1943, and a series of inspections the following month, Army Ground

9

Ibid 182-183. Neither the division nor the commander were named by McNair.
Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System (1954), 267. See Figure 1 for list.
11
Ibid 267. In general, the Army designates locations with permanently-stationed troops as “forts” while temporary
facilities or locations with no permanently-stationed troops as “camps”. Camp Hood has since been redesignated as
a fort.
12
Palmer and Keast, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 179. These overseas replacement depots were located at
Shenango, Pennsylvania and Pittsburg, California.
10
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Forces established its own overseas replacement depots.13 This arrangement was accompanied by
an extension of the infantry training curriculum from thirteen to fourteen weeks, then further
extended to seventeen weeks for the balance of the war.14
The extension of training from thirteen to seventeen weeks was one of five plans put
forward after Army Ground Forces briefly experimented with an eight-week course of common
or “branch immaterial” training, followed by a period of schoolhouse instruction once the
soldier’s MOS had been assigned.15 This was later reintroduced in August 1944 as a six-week
branch immaterial course prior to MOS assignment, but this concept was again dropped in early
1945.16 Although soldiers, regardless of branch, were expected to be proficient in some common
tasks, slight curriculum differences between branches meant that progression of training was
sometimes illogical.
In examining a breakdown of hours of instruction for training at the outset of the war
versus training after the 1943 reforms, some lessons learned over the course of the war were
apparent. A much greater emphasis was placed on individual skills rather than small-unit tactics,
with some exceptions.17 Crane, Lynch, Sheets, and Reilly noted that individual soldier skills
received approximately double the number of instructional hours in 1943 than in 1941, while
similar trends were noted for what Crane et al called lethality training (effectively weapons
training).18 The primary exceptions to these trends were in bayonet and grenade training, which
decreased from 20 and 16 hours of instruction, respectively, in 1941, to 16 and 8 hours of

13

Ibid 186-187. AGF overseas replacement depots were located at Fort Meade, Maryland and Fort Ord, California.
Ibid 188.
15
Ibid 396.
16
Ibid.
17
Crane et al., “Learning the Lessons,” 21.
18
Ibid. This included familiarization with weapons other than the standard service rifle (usually the M1 Garand
semiautomatic or 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifle). These weapons likely included individual weapons such as the
M1 Thompson or M3 “Grease Gun” submachine guns, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, along with crewserved weapons such as the M1919 medium machine gun or M2 heavy machine gun.
14
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instruction, respectively, after the 1943 reforms.19 Additional areas that received less emphasis
were fieldcraft, hand-to-hand fighting (referred to in modern terminology as “combatives”), and
basic military communication; in the latter two areas, soldiers had no formal instruction.20
Collective training at all levels was still given a relatively large amount of instruction.
Like bayonet and grenade training, however, the amount of instruction given in collective
training decreased after 1943.21 In this case, the decrease in emphasis on collective training was
the result of Army Ground Forces’ wariness of training soldiers in units organized along similar
lines to the ones that the trainees would be deployed to.22
The rationale in this case was that Army Ground Forces wanted to produce generalized
infantrymen rather than specialists in certain skills or weapons systems. Producing
submachinegunners or automatic riflemen in quantity would have been counterproductive,
according to this logic, because once mobilized, a line unit would only have so many of these
infantrymen as per its table of organization and equipment (TO&E).23 It therefore followed that
according to this logic, a training unit organized in a similar fashion could only produce so many
of those specialists, regardless of whether or not losses among those specialists were above or
below those replacement rates.24 Army Ground Forces came to the conclusion that it was simply
more efficient to produce replacement riflemen who could qualify on other weapons than those
issued in basic training, then learn the specializations based upon in-theater instruction. If the

19

Ibid. A postwar study conducted by S.L.A. Marshall, then a brigadier general, supported the de-emphasizing of
bayonet drills, including data from the ongoing Korean War. See also Ibid 33-34.
20
Ibid 21. It is possible that combatives were included as part of physical training. This topic is discussed later.
21
Ibid.
22
Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 410.
23
Ibid 407. This argument was put forward by Maj. Gen. Harry Hazlett, commander of Replacement and Schools
Command.
24
Ibid.
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replacement was used solely in the capacity of a rifleman, then there was little risk in training for
the wrong weapon.
Training the Unit
Unit training was typically based on the division, since this was generally considered to
be the smallest permanent unit that could be expected to deploy. This theory was also applied to
activating new divisions, which would also include individual training for filler replacements.
Prior to June 1942, newly organized divisions were constituted from a cadre, or
leadership element, of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men.25 This cadre was selected
approximately two to three months before the division was officially activated, generally as a
way to get divisional leadership to plan out the expected availability dates for phases of
training.26 These availability dates were based on a 54-week cycle after the activation date,
including an allotted 15 days for enlisted filler replacements to arrive at and be processed into the
division and the eight week “branch immaterial” phase of individual training.27
From June 1942 to early 1943, slight changes in organization were observed, though the
training cycle itself did not change until later. General practice indicated a growth of 44 officers
and 270 enlisted men, resulting in a cadre of 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men, while an
overstrength component of 15% was added in the case of losses (i.e. failure to complete training,
accidents, selection for specialized schools or other training, et cetera).28 The final composition
of a division in the organization process likely consisted of 248 officers and 1,679 enlisted men

25

Bell I. Wiley, “The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions,” in Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces
(1994) 435-436.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid 438.
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in cadre, with 452 officer and 13,425 enlisted filler replacements, totaling 15,804 officers and
men.29
In late 1942 to early 1943, unit training was shortened from 44 weeks to 35 weeks.30 This
was broken down as follows: 13 weeks (as per the pre-1943 infantry replacement training
standards) of individual training, 11 weeks of unit training, and 11 weeks of combined-arms
training.31 For the individual combat arm, the 11-week combined-arms phase of training was a
prolonged validation period, proving that the combat arm in question, be it armor, artillery, or
infantry, could work in concert with at least one of the other two arms.32 The unit and combinedarms phases could be conducted at the division’s home station, but more often than not, they
were conducted at five maneuver areas scattered throughout the United States.33
Based upon expected shipping dates for units, a divisional unit could be expected to go
through at least one maneuver area during its period of stateside training. They tended to
specialize in types of operational environments; for example, the West Virginia Maneuver Area
was used for familiarization in mountaineering as well as warfare in woodland terrain, while the
California-Arizona Maneuver Area specialized in hot-weather environments such as deserts.34
In their most basic form, the maneuver areas consisted of empty or unused land
surrounding a central installation. In some cases, airfields and associated gunnery or bombing
ranges were also used for specialist training, as well as for flying units from the Army Air

29

Ibid. Note that this figure without the overstrength allowance approximates the 28th Infantry Division’s authorized
wartime strength of approximately 14,000 officers and men. See Jeffrey P. Holt, “Operational Performance of the
U.S. 28th Infantry Division, September to December 1944,” (master’s thesis, United States Army Command and
General Staff College, 1994), 36.
30
Wiley, “Training Infantry Divisions,” in Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 444.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid 446-448.
33
“Shortage of Railroad Equipment for Transportation Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee Pursuant to S.
Res. 185,” (United States Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Washington D.C., 1943), 260. These were
located in Oregon, California, Tennessee, Louisiana, and West Virginia.
34
“Shortage of Railroad Equipment” (1943), 260.
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Forces.35 The central installation was used for processing units and their equipment as they
arrived at the maneuver area, as well as the training staff itself and ancillary personnel such as
base mechanics, cooks, signals and communications specialists, and so forth.36 Depending upon
the maneuver area’s environment or purpose, technical advisors or instructors would accompany
the training staff, who served as umpires or referees for the force-on-force portion of the
exercise, and range safety officers who supervised live-fire portions of the exercise.37
Although safety was considered to be vital during the unit and combined-arms phases of
training, injuries and fatalities were very real hazards. One incident in March 1944, in the West
Virginia Maneuver Area, resulted in the loss of two enlisted men and one officer before any of
them had set foot overseas.38 While attempting to cross the Blackwater River south of the town
of Davis, a soldier from the 35th Infantry Division lost his footing and was swept away by the
current. A nearby officer jumped in to try to rescue the soldier, but he too was swept away. A
third soldier was also swept away downstream. All three drowned, but only one body was
ultimately recovered.39
Physical Readiness Training
In March 1941, a new field manual superseded prior literature regarding physical
readiness training.40As more conscripts were inducted into the Army, it became apparent that
“the average recruit does not possess the degree of physical fitness required of a trained

35

“Site Layout: Northwest Maneuver Area,” [map], scale not given, US Army Corps of Engineers, n.d. By way of
example, the Oregon, or Northwest Maneuver Area, comprised the central post of Camp Abbott, with the nearby
Fort Rock Maneuver Area, Redmond Army Airfield, and two air-to-ground weapons ranges.
36
Nathan A. Marzoli, "“The Best Substitute”: U.S. Army Low-Mountain Training in the Blue Ridge and Allegheny
Mountains, 1943–1944," Army History, no. 113 (2019): 12.
37
Marzoli, “The Best Substitute,” (2019) 12.
38
Ibid 16.
39
Ibid.
40
“FM 21-20 Basic Field Manual: Physical Training” (Department of War, Washington, D.C., 1941), 1.
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soldier.”41 To correct this, physical training was a vital aspect of both individual and unit
training.42
Physical readiness training, as the Army understood it, was not yet a fully standardized
process as outlined in the present-day Army Combat Fitness Test,43 but the Army did want to
establish a baseline statistic that it considered an acceptable minimum. It is important to note that
the minimum standards for physical fitness testing were given as standards in field uniform,
rather than in PT uniform.44
To meet the minimum standards, as put forth in the 1941 version of FM 21-20 (i.e. the
lowest of four categories that the Army published), a soldier had to be able to complete a 100
yard dash in 14 seconds, a running high jump of 45 inches, a running broad jump of 12 feet, and
20 push-ups, graded for form. Additional minimum standards included a half-mile run of 3
minutes and 15 seconds, while a quarter mile was supposed to be completed in 87 seconds.45
While these minimum standards were not particularly difficult for the average soldier to exceed
once training was complete, it was not uncommon for otherwise qualified inductees to wash out
of training or to be rejected outright from military service.46
In 1941 and early 1942, Colonel Theodore Bank, at that time Chief of the Athletic and
Recreation Branch, began to collaborate with Charles McCloy of the University of Iowa and

41

“FM 21-20” (1941), 1.
Ibid.
43
The ACFT is in the process of superseding the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). It is scheduled to replace the
APTF no later than October 2020.
44
Ibid 5-6. It is possible, if not likely, that a physical training uniform was not prescribed at all, though FM 21-20
does show the soldier demonstrating calisthenics as wearing athletic clothing.
45
Ibid.
46
Whitfield B. East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment,
(Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013), 82.
42
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A.A. Esslinger of Stanford University in designing a standardized PRT testing model.47 In total,
25 separate tests were administered to approximately 400 soldiers.48 Bank, McCloy, and
Esslinger found that ten events correlated with determining overall fitness: Pullups, burpees,
broad jumps, 75-yard piggyback runs, a dodging run, a six-second dash, situps, and a 300-yard
run. The tests were then validated by a battalion of the 125th Infantry Regiment, stationed at
Camp Page Mill, California.49
The resulting test battery was the Army Ground Forces Test (AGFT), officially adopted
in 1942, with nine total events: Pullups, burpees, squat jumps, pushups, a 70-yard piggyback run,
situps, a 300-yard run, a 75-yard zig-zag run, and a 4-mile loaded road march.50 This test was
revised yet again in 1944 by eliminating the zig-zag run and loaded road march events, and
additionally lengthening the piggyback run event to 100 yards. The revised test, dubbed the
Physical Efficiency Test Battery (PETB), was published in War Department Pamphlet (WD
PAM) 21-9 in May 1944.51
Unlike the 1941 version of FM 21-20, WD PAM 21-9 used a far more detailed,
percentile-based system of scoring, with five scoring categories.52 Still, there were deficiencies
in the adopted test. An “average” score could, in theory, net the tested soldier only 285 out of
700 total points; percentiles for the “average” category could be as low as the 35th percentile.53

47

East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 89. COL Bank was known for playing quarterback at the University of
Michigan under Fielding Yost, then coaching at Tulane University and the University of Idaho while serving in the
Army Reserves.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid 89-90. Conveniently, Camp Page Mill had been constructed on land donated by Stanford University. See Don
McDonald, Early Los Altos and Los Altos Hills (Arcadia Publishing: Mount Pleasant, SC, 2010), 95.
50
East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 90. Although administering the AGFT was optional, it was strongly
recommended.
51
“WD PAM 21-9: Physical Conditioning” (Department of War, Washington, D.C., 1944) 71. Testing events were
presumably selected due to minimal equipment requirements. See Figure 2 for events and rough scoring standards.
52
“WD PAM 21-9” (1944) 79.
53
Ibid.
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Additionally, a study conducted by the Army Ground Forces Medical Research Laboratory,
conducted from September 1942 to March 1944 found that individual performance on the AGFT
tended to be overpredicted, with most test subjects performing better than average.54
Nonetheless, the AGFT and PETB represented a marked improvement in understanding
how physical readiness and training correlated to the training cycle. Planners generally
understood three phases of physical training, the first two phases of which more or less coincided
with the originally envisioned thirteen-week training cycle.55 Training sessions were originally
intended to take 1.5 hours per day, under FM 21-20.56 In practice, this requirement was not fully
met by physical training sessions, but individual training could often cover for the balance of
physical training requirements.
Bank et al found that the first two phases of physical training were the toughening and
slow improvement phases.57 This generally coincided with Bank, McCloy, and Esslinger’s
experiences in coaching or other applications of sports medicine.58 The first phase, or the
toughening phase, was characterized in WD PAM 21-9 by “a period of muscular stiffness and
soreness”, which the individual soldier would recover from in the normal course of training.59
During this phase, which would ordinarily last between one to two weeks, soldiers would focus
more on precisely executing repetitions rather than executing them in quantity.60
The slow improvement phase would take up the bulk of the training cycle, depending
upon the age or starting fitness of the individual soldier.61 Contrary to its name, the slow

54

Ibid 98. Conversely, Army Air Forces’ physical tests tended to underpredict physical fitness.
Ibid 99.
56
Ibid.
57
East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 99.
58
Ibid.
59
“WD PAM 21-9” (1944) 62.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
55
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improvement phase was characterized in WD PAM 21-9 by initially rapid improvement in
fitness, usually characterized by increasing workload over time.62 At a certain point, however,
improvement was usually observed to taper off until the soldier’s individual improvements were
no longer appreciable, or alternatively had met or exceeded standards in the “excellent” score
category of the PETB.63
Once the slow improvement phase was complete, the individual soldier moved into the
sustainment phase. Because WD PAM 21-9 was adopted after the extension of training from
thirteen to seventeen weeks, the balance of individual training was conducted in the sustainment
phase, with the major concern being the continuation of a high degree of physical activity during
deployment.64
Although rehabilitation for soldiers returning to duty was a possibility, WD PAM 21-9
omitted sections regarding rehabilitation. It is therefore unclear as to which phase soldiers
returning to active duty after wounds or injuries went into, or even if a unit was to be taken out
of the battle line and sent for refit.
Movement Overseas
Once a unit was given orders for movement overseas, it could travel hundreds of miles
before even reaching a port of embarkation. Although American divisions possessed a far higher
degree of mechanization when compared to divisions in other armies, divisions heading overseas
typically avoided traveling by road for long distances.
Keeping in mind that road travel as a unit was an unlikely prospect, divisional units
would coordinate travel with railroad companies along the intended route. A statement made by

62

Ibid.
Ibid. See also Figure 2.
64
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Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Morris before a Senate committee illustrated the complexity of a typical
operation:
We will say that through the normal course of events a movement is ordered today. We
are told it is to leave Camp A on the 30th of December…and is to require 12 tourist
sleeping cars. In the meantime, between now and December 30, many other movements
will be organized. We set up a clearinghouse in our organization…they discover that on
the 31st of December there is going to be a movement which comes into Camp A and will
have, we will say, 14 tourist cars in it. If we let this movement go out on the 30th of
December, it means that the railroads are going to have to direct some equipment in there
to take those boys out on the 30th and on the 31st they are coming in with another
movement, which requires deadheading passenger equipment.65
In many cases, Lt. Col Morris’ example was actually grossly simplified; interline travel
was not discussed, although that was tangentially related to Morris’ area of expertise. That would
mean that Morris and other transportation personnel had to coordinate movements on two or
more railroads, most of which had limited experience with interline travel of whole trains. Those
railroad companies that did have experience with interline travel of whole trains would often be
hampered in their efforts by existing scheduling.
For the duration of the war, this situation was aggravated by lack of new rolling stock,
and when new rolling stock was available, it was often not available in appreciable quantities.66
This situation was only slightly alleviated by government restrictions on the use of sleeping cars
enacted by the Office of Defense Transportation at various stages throughout, and slightly after,
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the war, mostly between city pairs of short distances.67 In some cases, the situation was
significantly aggravated by large numbers of prisoners of war, chiefly German or Italian, needing
to be transported to inland prisoner-of-war camps.68
Despite these difficulties, the Army built temporary installations as staging areas for
overseas movement along highly trafficked rail lines, both for individual and unit movement.
These temporary installations were administratively used as subcamps for ports of embarkation,
meaning that each staging camp could be called upon to handle multiple divisions at a time.
Depending upon the size of the port of embarkation, there could be multiple staging camps
subordinated to it. Ultimately, a port of embarkation could handle approximately 100,000
personnel on one shipping day, though in practice shipping days could be weeks apart.69
As stated beforehand, because shipping dates could be infrequent and there was a strong
impetus to keep soldiers physically fit, gymnasiums, football or baseball fields, and other athletic
facilities were present in relatively large numbers in embarkation camps. For example, Camp
Kilmer had four gymnasiums and one baseball field, or roughly one athletic facility per 7,500
people (about half of one division).70 Camp Myles Standish had a multipurpose field and a
recreation hall, roughly one athletic facility per 12,000 people (slightly less than one division).71
With the average dwell time at a typical embarkation camp being 7 to 11 days, the unit
would then board another train.72 In most cases, this train would stop at or near piers or wharves,
where the unit would then debark, then finally board a ship out of the Zone of the Interior.
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The 28th Infantry Division’s Training Experience
Despite its use herein as a case study, the 28th Infantry Division had a somewhat unusual
reputation throughout the course of the Second World War. Its prewar makeup, in a postwar
analysis of enlistment data by Michael E. Weaver, indicated that half of all enlistees were high
school graduates, roughly 4.5 times greater than the national average of eleven percent,73 while
only three percent of new enlistees had less than an eighth-grade education, compared to the
prewar Army’s average of 31 percent of soldiers with less than an eighth-grade education.74 92
percent of the soldiers in Weaver’s sample were natives of Pennsylvania.75 The 28th Infantry
Division’s attachment to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ended, however, upon its
federalization on February 17, 1941.76
The division was organized along the lines of a “square” infantry division, meaning that
it was organized into four infantry regiments in two brigades each, with an artillery brigade of
three regiments and an engineer regiment.77 This was a relatively large formation for its time,
with a nominal strength of about 22,000 officers and men, but it was too large and unwieldly for
mobile operations.78
This structure was modified into the “triangular” division structure in January 1942,
which compensated for the loss of an infantry regiment and the downsizing of the artillery
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brigade to one regiment by increasing the number of vehicles available.79 Additionally, with the
increased number of vehicles available to the unit, the three individual regiments could operate
more autonomously with attached artillery, engineer, or other units. This theory of operation,
called the Regimental Combat Team (RCT), was also eventually adapted by the Marine Corps
during operations in the Pacific Theater.80
At this point, the division was in the thirteen-week individual training cycle discussed
previously, meaning that it was receiving filler replacements directly from reception centers.
Personnel exigencies also meant the transfer of more experienced officers and noncommissioned
officers to provide cadre personnel for newly organized divisions.81 This created problems
because every time a new group of men arrived, training was stopped and restarted. This
significantly delayed the completion of individual training to the point where the division was
conducting individual training during the unit and combined arms phases of training.82
Under standards for new divisions prior to 1942, the division should have been ready, or
nearly so, for deployment overseas. Because the division reorganized so late in its nominal
training cycle, along with aggravating factors such as personnel transfer and poor performance in
the 1941 Carolina Maneuvers, it was far from ready.83 In fact, these radical changes very likely
reset the division’s availability cycle to the individual training phase.
After reorganization and a more stable period of individual training in 1942, the division
moved to conduct amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnson, Florida, and Camp Pickett,
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Virginia in January 1943.84 For all units, not simply for the 28th ID, amphibious training was
characterized by “haste and confusion”, particularly at Camp Gordon Johnson, which succeeded
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts as the home of the Amphibious Training Center until the training
center was disbanded in late 1943.85 A postwar study found that:
At Camp Edwards and at Carrabelle [Camp Gordon Johnson] sufficient boats were never
available to allow all personnel of the student units to practice in boats at the same time,
so mock-ups were built on dry land and students were trained in them. These
improvisations were built the same size as the real boats and served as valuable training
aids in teaching methods of loading and debarking…Even moving boats and the rolling
sea were improvised on dry land to teach firing of machine guns mounted in landing
craft. The device used was a mock-up boat made of 2 x 4’s and burlap and mounted on a
jeep. The jeep then traversed a rolling roadway, similar to the roller-coaster idea, which
reproduced fairly accurately the motion of a boat in the water and afforded students
manning the machine guns an opportunity to try their hand at firing on a simulated
beachline from a simulated boat.86
Training organization at the Amphibious Training Center was conducted by what training
personnel called “groupments”, lettered from A to F. They were organized as follows:
Groupment A “consisted of all officers assigned to G-2, G-3, and G-4, and the division
automotive officer, engineer officer, ordnance officer, signal officer, surgeon, and
quartermaster.”87 Groupments B, C, and D each consisted of an infantry RCT.88 Groupment E
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was made up of the division headquarters, the military police company, the headquarters battery
for the divisional artillery regiment, reconnaissance troop, and other troops.89 By the time the
Amphibious Training Center had relocated to Camp Gordon Johnson, Groupment F, which
consisted of any attached commando or special operations troops, had been eliminated from the
training organization.90
Upon completing amphibious training at Camp Pickett and Camp Gordon Johnson, the
division moved to the West Virginia Maneuver Area, where it would conduct low-mountain and
woodland training operations for two months (August 1, 1943 to September 30 of that same
year).91 Training there was usually broken up into weekly segments, with the first week of
training given to instruction in mountain or night driving, packboard usage, and exercises at the
squad, company, and platoon levels.92 The second week was broken up into two battalion and
two RCT exercises, each lasting approximately one to two days.93 While descriptions of the 28th
ID’s experiences in these exercises are not known to be extant, an experience typical of
simulated combat came from the 77th Infantry Division’s 305th Infantry Regiment during the 77th
ID’s rotation through the West Virginia Maneuver Area.94
Under normal circumstances, an RCT would detach one battalion and certain supporting
elements to act as a notional “Red Force”. The rest of the RCT would operate as the “Blue
Force”.95 The 305th Infantry Regiment’s exercises took place at Jenningston, West Virginia, east
of Elkins, and were described as follows:
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Late on (sic) the evening of 27 November 1943, commanders received information that
the hypothetical “Red Division” was concentrating in the vicinity of Piedmont, 45 miles
to the northeast, and had sent forces to the west. Red patrols had also been sighted nearby
along the Dry Fork. The RCT was to attack at 0700 the following day. Their goal was to
establish a bridgehead over Dry Fork, with the objective of moving north and east to
seize a high ridge running from Pointy Knob #1, to Chimney Rock, to Pointy Knob #2,
and destroying all enemy forces encountered along the way.96
The 305th Infantry Regiment’s regimental exercise was terminated on the 30th at
approximately 1245, with the entire regiment reforming for a live-fire exercise beginning at 0830
on December 2.97 After each exercise, the training staff would then debrief unit leadership as to
what each unit did well and what each unit did poorly, such as failure to post security while in
assembly areas, failure to dig in while in a defensive posture, or “skylining” by walking along
exposed ridges.98
Once the training cycle at the West Virginia Maneuver Area was complete, the 28th ID
boarded troop trains bound for Camp Myles Standish in Taunton, Massachusetts.99 It is not
known how long this trip would have taken, but period timetables from the Western Maryland
Railway and Pennsylvania Railroad give an approximation for a similar trip to Camp Kilmer,
New Jersey as over 12 hours long.100 The division then boarded a troop ship for overseas
movement, and on October 18, 1943, the 28th Infantry Division arrived in Britain, establishing its
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headquarters at Tenby, Wales.101 By April 15, 1944, the division headquarters had been relocated
to Chiseldon.102
While stationed in Britain, the 28th Infantry Division continued to train for amphibious
assault. Training there was concentrated at the Assault Training Center in Woolacombe, Devon,
which had been chosen because its characteristics generally matched that of Omaha and Utah
Beaches.103 Rupperthal described the exercise area as a 25 square mile area, including 8,000
yards of beach on the Bristol Channel and another 4,000 yards of beach on the Taw estuary.104 A
second training area, based in Slapton, was not used by the 28th Infantry Division for training,
but it was eventually used for large-scale exercises as well.105 Training mimicked the training
cycles at Camp Pickett and Camp Gordon Johnson, but also included provisional units known as
Engineer Special Brigades.106 These would be attached to the divisions selected for the assault,
then detached to handle over-the-shore logistics as well as operating temporary “Mulberry”
harbors.107
In the event, the 28th Infantry Division was not actually selected for the landing on
Omaha or Utah Beach, although the three American divisions that ultimately were selected had
also trained at amphibious training centers within the United States, in addition to the Assault
Training Centers at Woolacombe and Slapton.108 In theory, however, the 28th Infantry Division
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was a very capable formation, particularly considering it had wasted a year of training prior to its
reorganization, gone through extensive personnel turnover, and had three divisional commanders
in just as many years.
Bloody Buckets
The first elements of the 28th Infantry Division landed at Omaha Beach on July 22, 1944,
approximately six weeks after the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions secured the beachhead.109 The
division was commanded by Major General Lloyd Brown, who had succeeded Maj. Gen. Omar
Bradley when the latter was reassigned.110 The situation into which the division was placed was a
relatively static, siege-like environment caused by the hedgerows prevalent in Normandy.111 To
make matters worse, coordination between Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces was
mediocre at best.112
An unusually unfortunate example of poor communication happened on July 25, just
three days into the 28th Infantry Division’s commitment to combat. First Army, to which the
division had been assigned as part of its XIX Corps, was focusing efforts on breaking out via the
town of St. Lo.113 On July 25, the plan was to advance following a preplanned airstrike on one of
these roads.114 Lieut. Gen. Courtney Hodges, commander of First Army, described what actually
happened:
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The sky was filled with the weary, earfilling drone of B-24s, and we looked through the
torn corner of the house to the north. As far as the eye could reach they came—flying in
twelves…The last notation I made in the count I was keeping for the General of those
overhead was at 1010, when another large group of heavies went overhead. The next
group, three or four minutes later, was the first to strike where unwanted. The warning
was the same—the eerie whistle—but it was more urgent than the previous day’s, and we
seemed to have more time to run. Most of the party reached the sunken road behind the
house, or the ditch behind the road, when the bombs hit and tore the earth to shreds.
Again, we found out later, they had smacked down the north-south road, and again to the
right, and again on the two leading battalions of the 120th Inf (sic: Infantry Regiment).
We got up…Against their advice, General McNair had insisted, for the second successive
day, in staying on the very front lines…When the first cluster of bombs hit, the Major
said that General McNair, to the very best of his knowledge, was occupying a foxhole
just off the road, and some thirty yards from him…He led us a few yards up the road,
twenty yards short of the crossroads at coordinate 446670, and there on the side of the
road itself, indisputably tossed there by the explosion of the bomb, was the body of
General McNair, recognizable by the shoulder patch and general’s stars.115
Including Lieut. Gen. McNair, approximately 100 men were killed and a further 500
wounded by a premature weapons release.116 This also included the commanding officer of the
120th Infantry Regiment, Col. Harry A. “Paddy” Flint.117 A few days later, a staff officer was
declared missing.118
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The 28th Infantry Division was not immune to its own casualties, and losses among junior
leaders, i.e. platoon or squad leaders, mounted especially rapidly.119 It was becoming obvious
that Maj. Gen. Brown was being overwhelmed by the pace of combat, and on August 12, Brown
was formally relieved of command, being replaced by Brigadier General James Wharton.120
Wharton was killed in action that same day, however, and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Norman
Cota.121
Following First Army’s breakout from Normandy, the 28th Infantry Division was
reassigned to V Corps.122 Just two weeks into Cota’s tenure, the division was ordered to attack
German positions in and near the eastern part of Paris.123 This attack was unusual in that the
division’s movement to contact was held as a public parade.124 This decision was on one hand
pragmatic, as it was the best way to get the division to regain contact with German forces, but on
the other, it was a political decision caused by disagreements between Eisenhower and de
Gaulle.125 In any event, the citizens of Paris watched as an American infantry division marched
down the Champs Elysees.
The division continued to move east, covering 270 miles in a span of ten days.126 Starting
on September 13, the 28th Infantry Division began its attack on the Siegfried Line.127 Shortages
of ammunition, as well as lack of equipment such as satchel charges and Bangalore torpedoes,
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meant that Cota could only commit two battalions, with the 112th Infantry Regiment temporarily
detached to another division.128
The mounting casualties among infantrymen, particularly in junior leadership, coupled
with shortages of critical equipment, meant that the division was quickly becoming ineffective in
combat. Cota finally released the rest of the two regiments under his command on September
14.129 The town of Üttfeld was nearly captured by elements of the 110th Infantry Regiment on
September 17, but due to losses among the entire V Corps, Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow ordered
Cota to break contact with German forces near Üttfeld, consolidate his forces, and prepare to
receive replacements.130 In five days of nearly continuous attacks, the 28th Infantry Division had
taken over nineteen hundred casualties, as well as 830 non-battle injuries, mostly combat stress
related. For the entire month of September, the division had suffered 230 killed in action, 1,815
wounded in action, 141 missing, 63 captured, and 961 other injuries.131 Recognizing the
division’s tenacity in combat as well as the number of casualties it had taken, German forces
dubbed the 28th Infantry Division “der blutiger Eimer”. This nickname was adopted by the
division in a tongue-in-cheek manner; men of the 28th Infantry Division soon referred to their
division as the “Bloody Buckets.”132
Replacements
By this point in the war, the training schedule for replacements had been modified into
the seventeen week-long curriculum. As previously mentioned, the infantry had the greatest need
of replacements, and operated thirteen Infantry Replacement Training Centers clustered in the
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southern United States.133 The replacements’ training, however, did not begin in these training
centers.
A replacement, regardless of branch, would be inducted at a reception center.134 Often,
this was a different location than the replacement’s training station. For example, Alan Tobie,
then a student at the University of Connecticut, was inducted at Fort Devens, in Ayer,
Massachusetts, then conducted basic training at Camp Croft in South Carolina, first as a
communications specialist, then later as a rifleman.135
Pre-induction physicals were primarily conducted by draft boards, mostly in county seats
or in nearby cities. For exceptions to this rule, such as the experience of Jay Gross, Jr., the draft
board’s location could be quite inconvenient; not counting travel time from Gross’ home in St.
Marys, Pennsylvania to the nearest rail station in Emporium, a one-way trip to Erie, where the
draft board physical was held, would take approximately five and a half hours.136
A student eligible for the draft at Gettysburg College in 1943 or later could expect to be
inducted into service at either Fort Meade, Maryland, or the New Cumberland Army Depot,
Pennsylvania; the latter accounting for approximately 90 percent of all Pennsylvanians entering
the Army.137 Most Gettysburg students, if drafted, tended to be inducted at Fort Meade.138 This
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process was conditional upon passing a second physical examination; upon passing, the inductee
would receive two weeks’ leave and be formally sworn in.139
When the inductee arrived at either Fort Meade or New Cumberland after the two weeks’
leave, he would receive inoculations, be issued uniforms, and conduct an aptitude battery.140 This
could take anywhere from four to forty days, with the mean being nine days.141 Once classified,
the newly minted soldier would then be sent to a replacement training center based upon
branch.142
After the seventeen-week training period, the infantryman, along with soldiers from other
branches or combat arms, would conduct overseas movement through one of the ports of
embarkation. In theory, although the replacement infantryman was less experienced in terms of
working in a small unit, he was better conditioned on an individual basis.
Conversely, the lack of collective training meant that combat replacements were not only
unaccustomed to their new units, but they also suffered, particularly without experienced
leadership. This perfect storm of a lack of collective training and the heavy losses that the 28th
Infantry Division suffered occurred just before a dramatic dip in the division’s performance. For
many replacements, it would prove deadly.
The Hürtgenwald
On October 27, 1944, the 28th Infantry Division relieved the 9th Infantry Division as part
of a reshuffling of corps areas of responsibility.143 Over the past month, all three corps in First
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Army had suffered significant casualties, but in general the First Army was arranged with XIX
Corps in the north (the left flank), VII Corps in the center, and V Corps in the south (the right
flank).144 The mission had been for the entire army to penetrate the Siegfried Line, but due to
casualties, this had proven to be a difficult endeavor.145
The 9th Infantry Division had been assigned a mission to secure VII Corps’ right flank on
September 29 by capturing the village of Schmidt.146 This had been deemed a key crossroads in
the Hürtgen Forest, which itself was a potential stronghold for German forces.147 Another
division, 3rd Armored Division, had also entered the Hürtgen two weeks before the 9th Infantry
Division, but had diverted to the north after its attack had stalled.148
The 9th Infantry Division’s attack did not fare much better. By October 16, the 9th
Infantry Division had suffered three casualties for every two yards it had advanced.149 After an
advance of less than two miles, its attack had stalled as well, with a cost of 4,500 casualties.150 In
addition to having to pull the 9th ID off of the line due to its unsustainable casualty rate, VII
Corps had been assigned to a new offensive on the city of Cologne.151 V Corps was therefore
assigned to the Hürtgen. Since the only division available was the 28th ID, it was given the 9th
ID’s old objectives.152
Unfortunately for the 28th ID, there were several key issues that would ultimately hinder
the division in combat. First, the German army had been able to achieve force concentration
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while in the defense.153 This meant that the German army’s natural advantage of being in the
defense was amplified by shorter supply lines and effectively outnumbered a single division. In
fact, between the 28th Infantry Division’s anticipated attack date on October 31 and VII Corps’
attack date of November 5, no other unit in Twelfth US Army Group would be on the offensive.
This meant that the division was conducting a corps-level offensive by itself.154
Second, because the division was conducting a corps-level offensive by itself, that meant
that combat power would be drawn away from the division’s objective. In this case, this meant
three separate attacks, each conducted by a reinforced RCT, rather than a division being
committed against a single objective.155 Additionally, though this likely had little impact on the
final execution of the attack, the three objectives had been selected at the corps level, with Cota’s
only leeway being which RCT was assigned to each objective.156
Finally, the rough terrain amplified a poor judgement call on Cota’s part. Cota declined to
send out patrols to ascertain the German army’s strength, instead relying on intelligence gathered
from the 9th Infantry Division and by V Corps.157 Further, this meant that Cota did not know if
local roads could adequately serve as supply routes and would have to rely on combat engineers
to improve these roads’ condition.
The 28th Infantry Division ultimately was opposed by elements of four German divisions,
all of which were relatively understrength but had an experienced cadre of officers and
noncommissioned officers.158 V Corps intelligence had only identified two, 89. and 275.
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Infanteriedivision, while 272. Volksgrenadierdivision and 116. Panzerdivision remained
unidentified.159
Although V Corps allocated a number of attached units to the 28th Infantry Division, Cota
elected to use only some of these units. Notably, Cota only committed two companies from an
attached armor battalion, while keeping the two attached tank destroyer battalions in reserve for
the entire engagement.160 This was partially a consequence of the attack’s reliance on dirt roads
and trails for supply routes, but on the other hand, the division had a habitual weakness when
operating with attached tank or dank destroyer units.161
The general lack of support from any form of armor meant that only two RCTs, the 109th
and 112th, had anything approaching success early on in the battle. The 109th managed a partial
success, capturing the village of Hürtgen but failing to secure the crossroads in the vicinity of the
village, while one of its battalions had blundered into a minefield.162 By midday on November 1,
the 112th RCT had captured Schmidt, but the RCT was strung out through three villages, without
entrenching for the night.163
The 110th RCT’s attack had gone extraordinarily poorly. With its 1st Battalion being held
in divisional reserve, the rest of the RCT had its attack stalled almost directly at the line of
departure.164 Unfortunately for the rest of the division, the 110th RCT’s bad luck was a harbinger
for the whole division.
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On November 4, 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment was routed and practically wiped
out by elements of 116. Panzerdivision.165 The following day, 2nd Battalion of the same regiment
was also routed after an intense artillery bombardment.166 On November 7, Lieut. Col. Peterson,
regiment commander of the 112th, was wounded and Maj. Ford, commanding 1st Battalion, 109th
Infantry Regiment, was killed.167 Offensive actions were cancelled, and what was left of the
division was pulled back to rest areas in Luxembourg. The division and its attachments had
suffered 6,184 casualties over the course of a week of fighting.168 The 112th Infantry Regiment
had lost two thirds of its total strength while every company-grade officer in the 110th Infantry
Regiment had been wounded or killed.169 One of the latter regiment’s battalions was reduced to
fifty-seven men.170
In terms of the extended training given to infantrymen, three extra weeks of training were
squandered by poor terrain, dogged enemy resistance, a dogmatic operations order, and
questionable decision-making at the divisional and corps level. Some successes were apparent—
the 112th Infantry Regiment had taken Schmidt, an objective that had eluded the men of the 9th
Infantry Division—but others, such as failing to dig in and establish defensive positions after an
assault, were failures that outweighed them. Once again, the 28th ID would have to rebuild.
Battle of the Bulge-Buying Time Before the Siege of Bastogne and Defense of St. Vith
On December 14, 1944, Col. B.A. Dickson, senior intelligence officer of the First Army,
received a debrief of a German-speaking Belgian civilian, who reported troop concentrations in
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the Eifel region, on the German/Belgian border.171 The debrief also described a greater
concentration of bridging equipment than usual.172 To Dickson, this indicated that the Germans
were about to execute an offensive. The report was dismissed as a hunch.
The 28th Infantry Division, meanwhile, had been reassigned to VII Corps under Maj.
Gen. Joseph L. Collins. To their northeast was the green 106th Infantry Division, and to their
south were the veteran 4th Infantry Division and 9th Armored Division.173 The 28th ID was
arrayed with the 112th Infantry Regiment on the northern (left) flank, the 110th Infantry Regiment
was in the center, and the 109th Infantry Regiment on the southern (right) flank. The division was
situated along a hard-surfaced highway dubbed “Skyline Drive”, with the 110th defending the
town of Clervaux in northern Luxembourg.
On December 16, the German attack caught the Allied armies off guard. The initial attack
in the 28th ID’s sector was conducted by 116. Panzerdivision, along with other elements of the
German 5. Panzerarmee, and by the following day the German attack had succeeded in breaking
through the 106th ID’s lines and routing the latter division.174 That meant that the northern flank
of the 28th ID, held by the 112th Infantry Regiment, had to be lengthened in order to cover what
was left of the 106th ID.175
In the center of the 28th ID’s line, the 110th Infantry Regiment was practically destroyed
yet again along with a reinforcing tank battalion. By 0930 hours on December 17, Col. Hurley
Fuller, commander of the 110th, reported that his command post in Clervaux had been overrun,
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describing the situation by saying that a German tank was “sitting in his front door and firing
in”.176 Additionally, the 110th was suffering from ammunition shortages.177 By December 18, the
remaining elements of the 110th withdrew from Clervaux, with COL Fuller and the remaining
company surrendering only after running out of ammunition.178 These survivors continued to
fight delaying actions along the Clervaux-Bastogne highway, along with elements of the 9th
Armored Division’s Combat Command R.179 The 110th’s delaying action would prove critical for
the 101st Airborne Division to arrive in and secure the town of Bastogne.
In the meantime, the 112th Infantry Regiment had joined with the 7th Armored Division,
the 424th Infantry Regiment of the 106th ID, and Combat Command B of the 9th Armored
Division in the defense of St. Vith. Over a 3-day period, this scratch team held the advance of the
LXVI. Armeekorps to a standstill, albeit at an extremely heavy cost and the town of St. Vith no
longer being a tenable defensive position.180
Although the Allied forces, including the 28th ID, were forced to give ground at a high
cost in men and in materiel, the 28th ID’s combat performance during the Battle of the Bulge
dramatically increased vice the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. In both battles, the impact of
soldiers returning to active duty from wounds was negligible, meaning that the bulk of
replacements in the division were completely inexperienced. Nonetheless, between the two
campaigns, not enough time would have elapsed for there to be meaningful changes in the length
or quality of replacement training.
Analysis of the 28th Infantry Division’s Performance
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By analyzing the 28th ID’s performance in combat through its participation in the Battle
of the Bulge, one might visualize the division’s performance on a graph as having two distinct
peaks and one distinct trough. The peaks generally coincided with the breakout from Normandy
and the Falaise Pocket in late July and August 1944 as well as the division’s delaying actions in
the Battle of the Bulge, while the trough coincided with the division’s participation in the Battle
of the Hürtgen Forest. However, the division had finished its individual training phase before the
lengthening of individual replacement training to seventeen weeks.
This would lead to the conclusion that individual training length was not a factor in the
performance of large units. Rather, the performance of large units was predicated more upon
collective training or integration, and in addition was heavily influenced by higher orders from
divisional leadership, higher headquarters at the corps level, and the enemy’s own resistance.
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Figure 1: Infantry Replacement Training Centers, Replacement and Schools Command181
Replacement Center
Camp Croft, SC
Camp Roberts, CA
Camp Wheeler, GA
Camp Wolters, TX
Fort McClellan, AL *
Camp Robinson, AR *
Camp Blanding, FL
Camp Fannin, TX **
Camp Hood, TX
Camp Gordon, GA
Camp Maxey, TX
Camp Howze, TX
Camp Livingston, LA
Camp Shelby, MS

Date Beginning Operation
March 9, 1942
“““
“””
“””
January 1943
“““
August 4, 1943
September 1943
March 1944
October 17, 1944
“““
October 18, 1944
November 13, 1944
February 12, 1945

* Converted from branch immaterial replacement centers
** Formed from combined assets of replacement centers marked *
Figure 2: Events and Standards for the Physical Efficiency Test Battery, Excellent Score
Range182
Event
Pullups
Situps
20 Seconds Burpees
Pushups
100 Yard Piggyback
300 Yard Run
Squat Jumps

181

Repetitions or Time
16-18
70-82
12.75-13.75
39-44
0:20-0:18
0:38-0:35
61-72

Raw Score Range
90-100
88-100
88-100
88-100
88-100
85-100
86-100

Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System (1954), 267, see also Roger K. Spickelmier, “Training of the
American Soldier During World War I and World War II,” (master’s thesis, United States Army Command and
General Staff College, 1987), 93. Croft, Roberts, Wheeler, and Wolters were extant infantry replacement training
centers at the outset of the conflict.
182
“WD PAM 21-9” (1944): 79. Situps and pushups were to be completed consecutively; test candidates could not
rest in the upright position.
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Figure 3: Comparative Events and Standards for the Army Combat Fitness Test, Heavy
Physical Requirements183
Event
3 Repetition Maximum
Deadlift
Standing Power Throw
Hand-release Pushups
Sprint-Drag-Carry Shuttle
Run
Leg Tucks
2 Mile Run

183

Repetitions, Weight,
Distance, or Time
200-340 lbs

Raw Score Range

8-12.5 meters
30-60
2:10-1:33

““
““
““

5-20
18:00-13:30

““
““

70-100

“Army Combat Fitness Test Initial Operational Capability: 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2020” (Center for
Initial Military Training: Fort Eustis, VA, 2019) 12. The pushup event was modified in the ACFT to include the
hand release. Leg tucks replaced the situp event and must be completed consecutively.
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Figure 4: 28th Infantry Division during the Liberation of Paris184

184

American Troops of the 28th Infantry Division March Down the Champs Elysees, Paris, in the "Victory" Parade,
August 29, 1944. Paris, France.
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Figure 5: Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, 28th Infantry Division185
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US Army Institute of Heraldry, 28th Infantry Division Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, 2 3/8” X 2 3/8”.
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